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Abstract: 
 
We introduce a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising agent, as a 
model for regulating a network monopoly.  The agent sets prices on cross-network goods 
taking either a complete, or arbitrarily small, share of the associated profit.  We examine 
welfare and profits with and without each agent type under both network monopoly and 
network duopoly.  We show that splitting up the network monopoly (creating network 
duopoly) may be inferior for both firm(s) and society compared with a network monopoly 
“regulated” by an agent and that society always prefers any of the four agent regimes over 
network monopoly and network duopoly.   
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1. Introduction 
Since Cournot (1838) economists have known that equilibrium prices are generally lower 
(higher) and society is better-off (worse-off) where firms producing complementary 
(substitute) goods collude to jointly maximise profits than when they behave 
independently.  Where firms are easily separable according to whether they produce 
complements or substitutes, the policy advice follows straightforwardly: encourage 
(discourage) collusion under complements (substitutes).  The tough line generally taken by 
governments and regulators against collusive behaviour follows the “firms producing 
substitutes” argument, whilst examples such as the ‘block exemption’ from the relevant 
provisions of the 1998 Competition Act given to multi-operator public transport pricing 
schemes in the UK (see Office of Fair Trading, 2006) follow the reasoning of “firms 
producing complements”.   
 Unfortunately, the coexistence of substitute and complementary relationships between 
firms’ demands in networks complicates matters.  A policy of allowing network monopoly 
(or collusion everywhere) has the advantage that externalities due to independent pricing 
between complements (which lead to higher prices) are internalised.1  However, collusion 
everywhere undermines the potency of potentially beneficial independent pricing across 
substitute parts of the network.  Similar converse arguments apply to splitting up a network 
monopoly (or discouraging collusion) to exploit competitive effects across substitutes.  
Indeed, Economides and Salop (1992), who explore the issue of pricing on a network, show 
that breaking up a network monopoly, even in the presence of substitutes, can result in 
higher prices.  Inevitably, this result is dependent on the relative weight of complementary 
                                                 
1
 There are also possible co-ordination and cost benefits to network monopoly, but we are concerned in this 
paper with price effects associated with strategic interplay between firms and agents under different 
organisations of the market.   
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versus substitute externalities in the network.  McHardy (2006) addresses a related 
question: on splitting a monopoly producer of complementary goods, creating 
complementary monopoly, how much post-split entry/competition is required into the 
production of each complement in order to yield an overall welfare improvement?  It is 
shown, in the two complementary good case, at least, that relatively little post-split 
entry/competition in one or other of the complementary goods is required to achieve this.  
Nevertheless, entry may not always be an attractive policy option, especially on a network.   
 An alternative policy would be to allow the firms to collude along complementary lines 
but not along substitute lines.  Such an approach is inevitably fraught with problems, not 
least of which is how to ensure that when the firms meet to collude on one variable they do 
not make agreements over the other.  Indeed, the general idea that collusion can be 
beneficial is at the very least somewhat counter-intuitive, and there is a widespread 
tendency to introduce a regulator to control pricing across a network, especially where the 
services are all operated by a single monopolist.   
 Yet another approach would be to enforce a separation in the industry e.g. by inserting a 
(supposedly) competitive layer between the network provider and the consumer. This was 
done in the early days of mobile telephony in the UK, when Cellnet and Vodaphone were 
obliged to sell to the public through service providers, but did not prove to be a very 
satisfactory solution (see Cave and Williamson, 1996, Section VI, for further details).  The 
regulator is typically a government agency, such as the Federal Communications 
Commission in the USA or the Office of the Rail Regulator in the UK, and in these 
circumstances even an active, pro-competition regulator is likely to be seen as the ‘dead 
hand’ of the state.  The rising importance of network industries in modern economies 
coupled with the difficulties of applying traditional regulatory approaches (e.g., Gilbert and 
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Riordan, 1995) makes this area one of considerable interest for policy-makers.   
 This paper introduces a different type of regulatory agent (that we have not seen before 
in the literature), one who operates much more within the industry and who may even take 
a share of the industry’s profits.  We examine how the employment of an independent agent 
may provide a useful instrument for regulators in separating the pricing decisions on 
complementary and substitute aspects of a network: allowing collusive pricing on 
complementary elements of the network without compromising the benefits of 
independent pricing amongst substitutes.   
 The following section introduces a simple network model with differentiated demands 
and derives the benchmark case of the welfare-maximising social planner.  In Section 3, the 
equilibria under three regimes are derived and compared: a network monopoly which (i) is 
unregulated (ii) faces an independent profit-maximising agent who sets the price on the 
cross-network commodity bundles, taking an arbitrarily small share of the associated profit 
(iii) faces an agent, but the agent sets the price and takes all profit on the cross-network 
commodity bundles.  Section 4 repeats the analysis for the case of independent (non-
collusive) network duopoly.  Section 5 examines the rankings of the seven regimes and the 
relative size of equilibrium values of key variables under each regime.  Section 6 is a 
conclusion. 
2. The Model 
Consider a simple demand system where consumption involves two commodities X and Y in 
fixed and (for simplicity but without loss of generality) equal proportions.2  Let there be two 
                                                 
2
 It is easily shown that given the assumption of fixed proportions along with (i) the fact that all 
agents maximise objective functions over a complete bundle of commodities rather than an 
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distinct versions of each commodity, 𝑋𝑖  and 𝑌𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,2), with firm m producing the 
combination (𝑋𝑚 ,𝑌𝑚 ) (𝑚 = 1,2).  Assuming that the distinct versions of each commodity 
are interchangeable (but not perfect substitutes), we refer to commodity bundle (𝑋𝑚 ,𝑌𝑚 ) as 
the single-network bundle and (𝑋𝑚 ,𝑌𝑛) (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2), as the cross-network bundle.  
Therefore consumers of the single-network bundle use only components provided by firm 
m whilst cross-network consumers consume bundles with one component from each firm.  
For example, mobile phone service operators charge different prices for access to their own 
network relative to other service providers’ networks, transport companies provide 
interchangeable tickets (tickets which can be used on other companies’ services), Microsoft 
and Apple both produce operating systems and software which are interchangeable to some 
extent and there are now a few companies who offer broadband/telephone-TV hybrid deals 
as well as the stand-alone products.  The issues examined here have similarities with those 
discussed in the bundling literature – however, in the present case, for simplicity and in 
order to allow a focus on pricing strategy effects, the forms in which consumption can take 
place and the degree of differentiation and compatibility are predetermined and do not 
feature as strategic choices (e.g., to weaken price competition, Denicolò, 2000, or deter 
entry, Peitz, 2008) and the modelling framework does not include consumer network 
externalities (e.g., Economides and Himmelberg, 1995).  Also, with the number of decision-
makers and the market structure given in each regime, the modelling differs from work 
concerned with two-sided platforms (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003). 
 For simplicity, we denote demand for commodity bundle (𝑋𝑖 ,𝑌𝑗 ) as 𝑄𝑖𝑗 .  As the basis for 
the system of demands we refer to the quadratic utility function (e.g. Shubik and Levitan, 
1980): 
                                                                                                                                                 
individual commodity and (ii) the symmetry of the model, the further assumption of equal 
proportions changes nothing within the model. 
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  𝑈 𝑄𝑖𝑗  = 𝑣 𝑄𝑖𝑗 −
𝑛
2 1+𝜇 
  (𝑄𝑖𝑗 )
2 +
𝜇
𝑛
  𝑄𝑖𝑗  
2
 + 𝑧 ,          (𝑖. 𝑗 = 1,2).              (1) 
where 𝑛 is the number of commodity bundles (here 𝑛 = 4), 𝜇 ∈ [0,∞) is a measure of the 
degree of substitutability amongst the commodity bundles (with 𝜇 = 0 for zero 
substitutability and 𝜇 → ∞ for perfect substitutes), 𝑧 is a numeraire good hence 𝑈 𝑄𝑖𝑗 (𝐏)  
is quasi-linear, justifying the use of a partial equilibrium analysis, 𝑣 is a positive parameter 
and 𝐏 is a vector of commodity bundle prices, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 .  Consequently, demand for commodity 
bundle 𝑄𝑖𝑗  is linear in prices: 
  𝑄𝑖𝑗 (𝐏) = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑗 +  𝛿𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑚𝑛≠𝑖𝑗  , (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2).            (2) 
𝛼 =
𝑣
4
, 𝛽 =
1+𝜇
4
, 𝛿 =
𝜇
16
 . 
 In this specification, 𝛽, which is related to the partial own-price elasticity of demand, is 
common for each commodity bundle the cross-price co-efficient, 𝛿, is also common across 
all alternative commodity combinations to 𝑖𝑗: all the alternative commodity bundles are 
equally good, but generally (for 𝜇 < ∞) imperfect, substitutes.   
 Having established the demand structure for the model we now briefly turn our 
attention to costs.  The central concern of this paper is with the relative prices, outputs, 
profit and welfare under different regulatory regimes.  For simplicity we assume marginal 
cost is constant and equal to zero.  Given that the structure of the model (the number of 
physical commodities) is a constant over all regimes, fixed costs play no part in decision-
making across regimes and are also assumed to be zero.  This does, however, assume away 
possible co-ordination costs under collusive regimes and assumes the introduction of the 
regulatory agent (whose role involves making only price decisions – it produces no physical 
outputs) is at zero additional cost.   
~ 8 ~ 
 
~ 8 ~ 
 
 The benchmark case of first-best social welfare maximisation is straight-forward.  
Welfare is the sum of profit and consumer surplus at a given set of prices.  Given the utility 
function is quasi-linear, consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆(𝐏) is a valid measure of welfare, where: 
  𝐶𝑆 𝐏 =  𝑈 𝐐 𝐏  − 𝐐 𝐏 𝐏 − z.              (3) 
Welfare, 𝑊 𝐏 , is therefore:   
  𝑊 𝐏 = 𝐶𝑆 𝐏 + 𝜋  𝐏 ,               (4) 
where 𝜋 (𝐏) is aggregate profit across the network3.  With zero costs 𝜋  𝐏 = 𝐐 𝐏 𝐏, hence: 
  𝑊 𝐏 = 𝑈 𝐐 𝐏  − 𝑧.                (5) 
The first-best social planner maximises (5) with respect to 𝐏 yielding the familiar result of 
price equal to marginal cost and hence in the present case a zero price regime: hence, the 
price of each commodity bundle under the social planner regime S is 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑆 = 0 ( ∀𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2).  
From (2) the social planner’s production of each composite bundle is: 𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝑆 = 𝛼.  Aggregate 
output, profit and welfare (here equal to consumer surplus) under the first-best welfare 
maximising case are then, respectively:  
  𝑄𝑆 = 4𝛼,   𝜋 𝑆 = 0 ,    𝑊𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 8𝛼2.             (6) 
 With the theoretical framework of the paper and benchmark case established, we now 
proceed to consider the relative merits of two different regulatory regimes against the 
unregulated case under, first, network monopoly in which a single firm initially provides all 
the services on the network, and second, non-collusive network duopoly, in which two rival 
                                                 
3 Tilde is used to indicate profit measured across the entire network as distinct from the case where 
profit is measured only across the firms (i.e. not accruing to the agent as in regimes M3 and D3 
below). 
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firms initially offer differentiated single-network operations which can be combined into 
two further cross-network operations.   
3. Perfect Collusion or Network Monopoly 
In this section we consider the equilibrium prices, outputs, profits and welfare in a situation 
of network monopoly where all commodity bundles (𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 ) (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2) are provided by a 
single profit-maximising firm or by two perfectly collusive firms with firm m producing m 
components 𝑋𝑚 ,𝑌𝑚  (𝑚 = 1,2).4   
 We are interested in examining three regimes.  The first regime (M1) is the unregulated 
case in which the monopolist sets all prices to maximise profit across the network.  In the 
context of this paper, this is equivalent to two single-network providers being allowed to 
collude on all prices.  The advantage of such a regime is that it internalises the cross-
network externalities in the model which put upward pressure on independently set prices: 
private incentives are, to some extent, aligned with social incentives in that by colluding on 
prices on this part of the network firms decrease price, raising profit and also social welfare.  
Such benefits would not be achieved if the social planner were to insist on separating the 
network monopoly into two single-network operations or to eliminate all collusion on 
pricing between two single-network operators (this is the situation in regime D1).  Clearly 
this policy does not come without its drawbacks: by allowing collusion on the network or by 
not splitting up the network monopolist, the potential gains in terms of decreased prices 
through competition between single-network commodity bundles is lost.  In the second 
regime (M2), the social planner employs an independent agent who is responsible for 
                                                 
4
 There is a possible distinction to be made between the network monopoly and perfectly collusive 
network duopoly in terms of the optimal choices of the number of commodity variants and the 
degree of differentiation between them.  However, in this paper we treat them as a constant across 
all regimes.   
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setting the price on the cross-network commodity bundles (𝑋𝑖 ,𝑌𝑗 )  (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 = 1,2) so as to 
maximise the associated profit of which it takes a share.  An independent, profit maximising 
agent is again employed in the third regime (M3).  However, in this case the agent keeps all 
the cross-network profit.  As in the case of M1, it is assumed that the social planner is unable 
or unwilling to either prevent collusion between a network duopoly or split up a network 
monopoly.  In examining regimes M2 and M3, we are asking whether the employment of an 
agent can yield an improvement upon a situation where firms are simply allowed to collude 
on price across all commodity bundles.   
 Beginning with regime M1, the network monopolist’s profit, in general terms, is given by:  
  Π𝑀1(𝐏) =  𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑚𝑚 (𝐏) + 𝑃𝑥𝑚=1,2  𝑄𝑚𝑛  (𝐏)𝑚≠𝑛=1,2 .           (7) 
Where, for ease of reference and given the symmetry of the model, 𝑃𝑥(= 𝑃𝑚𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛𝑚 ;𝑚 ≠
𝑛 = 1,2) is the common price of the cross-network commodity bundles.  The choice of this 
simplifying notation on cross-network price becomes apparent in Section 4.5   
 Using (2) and maximising (7) with respect to both 𝑃𝑚𝑚  and 𝑃𝑥  yields the following 
equilibrium single- and cross-network prices6: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝑀1 = 𝑃𝑥
𝑀1 =
8𝛼
4+𝜇
 .  (𝑚 = 1,2)             (8) 
Hence, the network monopolist does not discriminate on price across the different 
commodity bundles.  This result has to do with the symmetry of the model.  Substituting (8) 
                                                 
5
 It is important to note that the imposition of this symmetry on 𝑃𝑥  at this point has no bearing on the 
solutions given the general symmetry of the model and the assumption of monopoly, and later a 
single agent concerned with setting both 𝑃𝑚𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑛𝑚 .   
6 Note, all the second order conditions in the paper are met for the relevant parameter values and are 
not stated. 
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into (2) yields the following equilibrium expressions for quantity demanded of single- and 
cross-network commodity bundles: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝑀1 = 𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝑀1 =
𝛼
2 
 .   (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2)            (9) 
Aggregate output, profit and welfare under regime M1 are then, respectively: 
  𝑄𝑀1 = 2𝛼,   Π 𝑀1 =
16𝛼2
4+𝜇
 ,    𝑊𝑀1 = 6𝛼2.           (10) 
Remark.  It follows straightforwardly from comparison of (6) and (10) that the 
welfare loss due to the network monopoly regime (M1) against the first-best regime (S) 
is 25%, the usual value for a single-product monopoly under constant marginal costs 
and linear demand.   
 We now consider the second monopoly regime, M2, in which an agent is employed by the 
social planner to set the price on the cross-network commodity bundle.  Pricing is 
simultaneous and the agent seeks to maximise profit over cross-network demands, from 
which it gets an arbitrarily small fixed proportion, 𝜃.  The monopolist now sets 𝑃𝑚𝑚  and the 
agent sets 𝑃𝑥 = 𝑃𝑚𝑛  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2), in order to maximise their respective profit functions:  
  ΠM(𝐏) =  𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚=1,2 𝑄𝑚𝑚(𝐏) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑃𝑥 𝑄𝑚𝑛𝑚≠𝑛=1,2 (𝐏),         (11) 
  ΠA(𝐏) = 𝜃𝑃𝑥 𝑄𝑚𝑛(𝐏)𝑚≠𝑛=1,2 .         
Recognising symmetry, the relevant first-order conditions are, respectively: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚 =
𝛼+2𝛿 2−𝜃 𝑃𝑥
2(𝛽−𝛿)
,    𝑃𝑥 =
𝛼+2𝛿𝑃𝑚𝑚
2(𝛽−𝛿)
 .            (12) 
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Note, that whilst the monopolists reaction function is a function of 𝜃, the agent’s is not.  
Solving (12) simultaneously yields: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚 =
𝛼 𝛽+𝛿 1−𝜃  
2(𝛽 𝛽−2𝛿 −𝛿2 1−𝜃 )
,    𝑃𝑥 =
𝛼𝛽
2(𝛽 𝛽−2𝛿 −𝛿2 1−𝜃 )
.          (13) 
Taking limits yields the following equilibrium single- and cross-network prices under 
regime M2: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
M2 = lim
𝜃→0
𝑃𝑚𝑚 =
8𝛼 4+5𝜇 
7𝜇2+24𝜇+16
 ,    𝑃x
M2 = lim
𝜃→0
𝑃x =
32𝛼 1+𝜇 
7𝜇2+24𝜇+16
.         (14) 
It is important to note that this regime introduces strategic interaction between the firm(s) 
and the agent, making the case distinct from one in which 𝜃 = 0 is imposed in the general 
profit functions (11).  The latter simply returns the network monopoly case, M1.  Note also, 
from inspection of (14) and given 𝜇 > 0, the following is always true:  𝑃𝑚𝑚
M2 > 𝑃x
M2 .   
 Substituting (14) into (2), the equilibrium quantities in regime M2 are given by: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
M2 =
𝛼
2
,    𝑄𝑥
M2 =
2𝛼 3𝜇2+7𝜇+4 
7𝜇2+24𝜇+16
.            (15) 
Hence, on the single-network bundle the combined prices yield the monopoly level of 
output of single-network bundles but a higher level of output of cross-network bundles..   
 Aggregate output and profit, firm profit and welfare under regime M2 are then, 
respectively: 
  𝑄𝑀2 =
𝛼 19𝜇2+52𝜇+32 
7𝜇2+24𝜇+16
,    Π 
𝑀2
= Π𝑀2 =
8𝛼2 83𝜇3+308𝜇2+352𝜇+128 
(7𝜇2+24𝜇+16)2
,     
  𝑊𝑀2 =
𝛼2 703𝜇5+5262𝜇4+14832𝜇3+19744𝜇2+12544𝜇+3072 
2(1+𝜇)(7𝜇2+24𝜇+16)2
.          (16) 
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Proposition 1.7  (i) The firm(s) (weakly) prefer regime M1 over M2 (ii) The social 
planner (weakly) prefers regime M2 over M1:   
 Π
 M1 = Π 
M2
Π 
M1
> Π 
M2  𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑊M2 = 𝑊M1
𝑊M2 > 𝑊M1
   𝑖𝑓   
𝜇 = 0
𝜇 > 0
 . 
The monopolist and social planner, not surprisingly, have opposing rankings of the two 
regimes. 
 The third monopoly regime, M3, involves an agent who sets the price on the cross-
network commodity bundles, but keeps the entire share of profit on this part of the 
network, i.e. 𝜃 = 1.  Imposing 𝜃 = 1 in (13), yields the following equilibrium prices and 
quantities: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝑀3 = 𝑃𝑚𝑛
𝑀3 =
4𝛼
2+𝜇
 ,    𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝑀3 = 𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝑀3 =
𝛼(4+3𝜇)
4(2+𝜇)
.  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2)        (17) 
Like M1, under M3 there is symmetry in single- and cross-network prices and outputs.  This 
is a consequence of the demand symmetry of the model: both the firms(s) and the agent are 
faced with equivalent profit maximisation problems.   
 Aggregate output and profit, firm profit and welfare under regime M3 are then, 
respectively: 
  𝑄𝑀3 =
𝛼(4+3𝜇)
(2+𝜇)
, Π 
𝑀3
= 2Π
𝑀3
=
8𝛼2(4+3𝜇)
 2+𝜇 2
,    𝑊𝑀3 =
4𝛼2(12+5𝜇)(4+3𝜇)
2 2+𝜇 2
.        (18) 
Note, Π𝑀3 captures the total profit accruing to the firm(s), excluding the agent, which is the 
relevant measure of profit for comparison of firm well-being with other regimes.  However, 
                                                 
7 All proofs either follow straightforwardly or are detailed in the Appendix. 
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our measure of society’s well-being, 𝑊𝑀3, includes all profit on the network.  In cases M1 
and M2 profit to the firms and profit across the industry are the same. 
Proposition 2. (i) The firm(s) strictly prefer regime M2 over M3: ΠM2 > ΠM3; (ii) 
The social planner (weakly) prefers regime M3 over M2: 
 𝑊
M3 = 𝑊M2
𝑊M3 > 𝑊M2
   𝑖𝑓   
𝜇 = 0
𝜇 > 0
 . 
 To summarise, so far, the preference ranking of the network monopolist over the three 
regimes is the reversal of the ranking for the social planner with the case of the agent taking 
all cross-network profit being the least favourable to the monopolist and best for the social 
planner, and the free-market case being best for the monopolist and least good for the social 
planner.  M2 is a compromise regime for both firm(s) and the social planner. 
4. Non-Collusive Network Duopoly 
In this section, we examine the effects of ruling out collusion or splitting a network 
monopoly.   We now have a situation in which two separate non-collusive firms provide the 
substitute single-network operations (𝑋𝑖 ,𝑌𝑖), and also contribute to two cross-network 
commodities: firm m provides the m component of (i) 𝑄𝑚𝑚 , (ii) 𝑄𝑚𝑛 , and, (iii) 𝑄𝑛𝑚  
(𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).  Essentially, this section seeks to address the question: Could the monopoly 
or perfectly collusive regimes in Section 3, with and without an agent, be improved upon by 
splitting up a network monopoly or deterring collusion between network duopolists? Note, 
when comparing regimes in terms of attractiveness to the firms it is now important to treat 
the monopoly case as a perfectly collusive duopoly where each firm takes half of the overall 
profit.  Thus, in each case half the non-agent profit goes to each of the firms under each 
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regime and the firms’ preferences can be determined by referring to aggregate firm profit 
(which is distinct from industry-wide profit).   
 We begin, as in section 3, by considering a regime, D1, in which the firms operate 
without an agent but now set their single-network price and component of the cross-
network commodity bundle prices independently and simultaneously.  Regime D2 involves 
the employment of an agent in the setting of the price for the cross-network commodity 
bundles in such a way as to maximise its arbitrarily small share of profit on the cross-
network operation, whilst regime D3 involves employment of an agent who retains all the 
profit on the cross-network commodity bundles. 
 We assume each firm m sets the price of its own component, 𝑃𝑥𝑚  (𝑚 = 1,2), of the cross-
network commodity bundle price.  Whilst the usefulness of the notation 𝑃𝑥  should now be 
apparent it requires further explanation here.  As it stands, the notation 𝑃𝑥𝑚  does not 
distinguish between firm m’s price component on the cross-network commodity mn and 
cross-network commodity nm.  However, given the symmetry of the model, this restriction 
turns out to be unimportant.  It also follows that the cross-network commodity bundle 
price, 𝑃𝑥 , is the sum of these two component prices for both cross-network combinations:  
  𝑃𝑥 = 𝑃𝑚𝑛 =  𝑃𝑥𝑚𝑚=1,2  ,   (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).         (19) 
Given (17) the general expression for the profit of firm m is given by, Π𝑚
𝐷1: 
  Π𝑚
𝐷1(𝐏) = 𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑚𝑚 (𝐏) + 𝑃𝑥𝑚 (𝑄𝑚𝑛 (𝐏) + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 (𝐏)),   𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2 .       (20) 
Using (2) and (19) in (20) and maximising with respect to 𝑃𝑚𝑚  and 𝑃𝑥𝑚  for 𝑚 = 1,2, yields 
the following first order conditions, respectively: 
  𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝛿𝑃𝑛𝑛 + 4𝛿𝑃𝑥𝑚 + 2𝛿𝑃𝑥𝑛 = 0,   𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2 ,      (21a) 
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  2𝛼 −  2𝛽 − 𝛿 2𝑃𝑥𝑚 − 2 𝛽 − 𝛿 𝑃𝑥𝑛 + 4𝛿𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 2𝛿𝑃𝑛𝑛 = 0.      (21b) 
Given the symmetry of the problem, in equilibrium, 𝑃𝑥𝑚 = 𝑃𝑥𝑛  and 𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 𝑃𝑛𝑛 , and given 
(19), solving (20) simultaneously yields the equilibrium expressions for the cross- and 
single-network commodity bundle prices, respectively: 
  𝑃𝑥
𝐷1 = 𝑃𝑥1
𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑥2
𝐷1 =
64𝛼
3(3𝜇+8) 
,    𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝐷1 =
16𝛼
3𝜇+8
.           (22) 
Clearly, 𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝐷1 < 𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝑀1  and 𝑃𝑥
𝐷1 > 𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝐷1  and the cross-network bundle is more expensive than 
the single-network bundle.  We will see later that this is the only regime where this is true.  
Using (22) in (2) yields the following equilibrium expressions for cross- and single-network 
demands, respectively: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝐷1 =
𝛼
3  
,    𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝐷1 =
4𝛼(2𝜇+3)
3(3𝜇+8)
.    
Aggregate output, profit and welfare under regime D1 are then, respectively: 
  𝑄𝐷1 =
2𝛼(11𝜇+20)
3(3𝜇+8)  
, Π 
𝐷1
= Π 𝐷1
128𝛼2(9𝜇+17)
9(3𝜇+8)2
, 𝑊𝐷1 =
2𝛼2(275𝜇3+1586𝜇2+1504𝜇+1504)
9(1+𝜇)(3𝜇+8)2
. (23) 
Proposition 3. (i) The firm(s) strictly prefer regime M1 over D1 and D1 over M3: 
Π 𝑀1 > Π 𝐷1 > Π𝑀3; (ii) The preferences of the firms over regimes M2 and D1 depend 
upon the degree of substitutability according to: 
 
Π 𝑀2 > Π 𝐷1
Π 𝑀2 = Π 𝐷1
Π 𝐷1 > Π 𝑀2
  𝑖𝑓  
0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇∗
𝜇 = 𝜇∗
𝜇 > 𝜇∗
    where 𝜇∗ = 3.490 (3 𝑑.𝑝. ); 
(iii) The social planner strictly prefers regime M2 over D1: 𝑊𝑀2 > 𝑊𝐷1 ;  (iv) The social 
planner’s preferences over regimes M1 and D1 vary with the degree of substitutability 
according to: 
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𝑊𝑀1 > 𝑊𝐷1
𝑊𝑀1 = 𝑊𝐷1
𝑊𝑀1 < 𝑊𝐷1
  𝑖𝑓  
0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇∗∗
𝜇 = 𝜇∗∗
𝜇 > 𝜇∗∗
    where 𝜇∗∗ = 2.418 (3 𝑑.𝑝. ). 
This is an important result.  First, network monopoly (M1) may be preferred by society to 
unregulated duopoly (D1) if 𝜇 is sufficiently small: hence the positive effects through 
competition on substitute services created by splitting up a monopoly network are 
outweighed by the negative complementary externalities.  Second, for society, the monopoly 
under regulatory agent M2 is always preferable to unregulated duopoly (D1).  McHardy 
(2006) concludes that social planners wishing to make improvements upon monopoly 
(perfectly collusive complementary monopoly) should not split up the monopoly and create 
a situation of complementary monopoly if there is little prospect of separation leading to 
entry and competition in the production of the complementary goods.  Proposition 3 
suggests that even where such post-separation entry is unlikely, employment of a 
regulatory agent may provide a partial solution to this problem.   
  We now introduce regime D2 in which the independent agent sets the cross-network 
commodity bundle prices so as to maximise its own profit: an arbitrarily small fixed 
proportion, 𝜃, of the profit on the cross-network operation. The general expression for 
profit on the cross-network operation is given by: 
  Π𝑥
𝐷2(𝐏) = 𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 (𝐏) + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 (𝐏)),  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).   
of which the share to firm m and to the agent are respectively: 
  Π𝑥𝑚
𝐷2 (𝐏) =
1
2
 1 − 𝜃 𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 (𝐏) + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 (𝐏)),          (24a) 
  Π𝐴
𝐷2(𝐏) = 𝜃𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 (𝐏) + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 (𝐏)),  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).      (24b) 
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In the simultaneous price-setting scenario, the agent sets 𝑃𝑥  to maximise its profit (24b), 
whilst firm m sets 𝑃𝑚𝑚  to maximise: 
  Π𝑚
𝐷2 𝐏 = 𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑚𝑚  𝐏 +
1
2
 1 − 𝜃 𝑃𝑥 𝑄𝑚𝑛 (𝐏) + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 (𝐏) , (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).       (25) 
Substituting (2) into (25) and maximising with respect to 𝑃𝑚𝑚 , yields the following first 
order condition:  
  𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝛿 2𝑃𝑥 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛  + 2𝛿𝑃𝑥 1 − 𝜃 = 0 , (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).        (26) 
Similarly, substituting (2) into (24b) and maximising with respect to 𝑃𝑥 : 
  𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑃𝑥 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑃𝑥) = 0.            (27) 
Recognising symmetry (𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 𝑃𝑛𝑛 ) and solving (26) and (27) simultaneously, yields: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 𝑃𝑛𝑛 =
16𝛼(4+𝜇(5−𝜃))
(17+2𝜃)𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,    𝑃x =
8𝛼(8+9𝜇)
(17+2𝜃)𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,  𝑚 = 1,2 .        (28) 
Taking limits yields the following expressions for the equilibrium single- and cross-network 
commodity bundle prices, respectively: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
D2 = lim
𝜃→0
𝑃𝑚𝑚 =
16𝛼(4+5𝜇)
17𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,   𝑃𝑥
D2 = lim
𝜃→0
𝑃𝑥 =
8𝛼(8+9𝜇)
17𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).      (29) 
Clearly 𝑃𝑚𝑚
D2 > 𝑃𝑥
D2: the firms set prices above the agent.  Substituting (29) in (2) yields the 
following equilibrium commodity bundle demands: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝐷2 =
𝛼(11𝜇2+28𝜇+16)
17𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,      𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝐷2 =
𝛼(27𝜇2+60𝜇+32)
2(17𝜇2+52𝜇+32)
 , (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).   
Aggregate output, profit and welfare under regime D2 are then, respectively: 
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  𝑄D2 =
𝛼(49𝜇2+116𝜇+64)
(17𝜇2+52𝜇+32)
,    Π 
𝐷2
=
8𝛼2(463𝜇3+1492𝜇2+1536𝜇+512)
(17𝜇2+52𝜇+32)2
,    
  𝑊𝐷2 =
𝛼2(4263𝜇5+29030𝜇4+74528𝜇3+91232𝜇2+53760𝜇+12288 )
2(1+𝜇)(17𝜇2+52𝜇+32)2
.        (30) 
Proposition 4. (i) The firm(s) strictly prefer regime D2 over M3: Π 𝐷2 > Π 𝑀3; (ii) 
The firm(s) (weakly) prefers regime M2 over D2;  
 Π
 M2 = Π D2
Π M2 > Π D2
   𝑖𝑓   
𝜇 = 0
𝜇 > 0
 ; 
(iii) The preferences of the firms over regimes D2 and D1 depend upon the degree of 
substitutability according to: 
 
Π 𝐷2 > Π 𝐷1
Π 𝐷2 = Π 𝐷1
Π 𝐷2 < Π 𝐷1
  𝑖𝑓  
0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇∗∗∗
𝜇 = 𝜇∗∗∗
𝜇 > 𝜇∗∗∗
    where 𝜇∗∗∗ = 2.175 (3 𝑑. 𝑝. ); 
(iv) The social planner (weakly) prefers regime M3 over D2 and D2 over M2: 
 𝑊
M3 = 𝑊D2 = 𝑊M2
𝑊M3 > 𝑊D2 > 𝑊M2
   𝑖𝑓   
𝜇 = 0
𝜇 > 0
 . 
 Finally, we introduce regime D3, in which the independent agent keeps all profit on the 
cross-network bundle.  Setting 𝜃 = 1 in (28) yields the equilibrium single- and cross-
network prices, respectively: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
D3 = 𝑃𝑛𝑛
D3 =
64𝛼(1+𝜇)
19𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,    𝑃x
D3 =
8𝛼(8+9𝜇)
19𝜇2+52𝜇+32
  (𝑚 = 1,2)       (31) 
Note, 𝑃𝑚𝑚
D3 < 𝑃𝑚𝑚
D2  and 𝑃x
D3 < 𝑃x
D2 .  Substituting (31) in (2) yields the following equilibrium 
commodity bundle demands: 
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  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝐷3 =
16𝛼(𝜇2+2𝜇+1)
19𝜇2+52𝜇+32
 ,    𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝐷3 =
𝛼(27𝜇2+60𝜇+32)
2(19𝜇2+52𝜇+32)
  ,  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).   
Aggregate output, profit and welfare under regime D3 are then, respectively: 
  𝑄𝐷3 =
𝛼(59𝜇2+124𝜇+64)
(19𝜇2+52𝜇+32)
,      Π𝐷3 =
8𝛼2(499𝜇3+1524𝜇2+1536𝜇+512)
(19𝜇2+52𝜇+32)2
,       
  𝑊𝐷3 =
𝛼2(5487𝜇5+34222𝜇4+82208𝜇3+95968𝜇2+54784𝜇+12288 )
2(1+𝜇)(19𝜇2+52𝜇+32)2
         (32) 
Proposition 5. (i) The firms strictly prefer regime D3 over S (ii) The firms (weakly) 
prefer regime M3 over D3 (iii) The social planner (weakly) prefers regime D3 over M3:   
 Π
 M3 = Π 
D3
Π 
M3
> Π 
D3  𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑊D3 = 𝑊M3
𝑊D3 > 𝑊M3
   𝑖𝑓   
𝜇 = 0
𝜇 > 0
 ; 
(iv) The social planner strictly prefers regime S over D3: 𝑊𝑆 > 𝑊𝐷3.  
Corollary. Propositions 1 - 5 give a complete ranking of the seven regimes in firm 
(non-agent) profit and welfare over the domain 𝜇 ∈ [0,∞).   
5. DISCUSSION 
The propositions of Sections 3 and 4 have provided information on rankings over the seven 
regimes for the profit-maximising firms and for the social planner.  The positions of certain 
regimes in the rankings are dependent on the level of 𝜇.  These conditional rankings are 
reproduced in Table 1, below.   
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Table 1  
Firm (Non-Agent) Profit and Welfare Rankings by Regime (from highest to lowest) 
μ = 0 0 < μ < 2.175 2.175 < μ < 2.418 2.418 < μ < 3.490 3.490 < μ 
π W π W π W π W π W 
M1* S M1 S M1 S M1 S M1 S 
M2* D3
†
 M2 D3 M2 D3 M2 D3 D1 D3 
D2* M3
†
 D2 M3 D2 M3 D1 M3 M2 M3 
D1 D2
†
 D1 D2 D1 D2 D2 D2 D2 D2 
M3** M2
†
 M3 M2 M3 M2 M3 M2 M3 M2 
D3** M1
†
 D3 M1 D3 M1 D3 D1 D3 D1 
S D1
†
 S D1 S D1 S M1 S M1 
Regimes of equal rank are indicated by matching *, **, 
†
. 
 
 First, for the firms, not surprisingly, the unregulated monopoly regime M1 is always (at 
least weakly) preferred.  However, it is least preferred for the social planner for sufficiently 
high levels of 𝜇.  If 𝜇 is sufficiently low, then regime D1 is actually worse than M1 for the 
social planner: splitting up the profit-maximising network monopolist into independent 
network duopoly reduces welfare.  This is a variant of the result that complementary 
monopoly is worse than monopoly.  For high levels of 𝜇 regime D1 becomes the second best 
regime for the firm(s).  Regimes M3 and D3, are always high-ranking for the social planner 
but understandably not for the firms – all profit on the cross-network bundles go to the 
agent.  Regimes M2 and D2 are in the top four for the firms and D2 is ranked fourth for the 
social planner.  Regime D2 has potential as a compromise for both firms and the social 
planner. 
 In order to draw more insightful judgements about the merits of the various regimes, it is 
necessary to have some indication about the relative payoffs for each party (excluding the 
agent) in each regime.  Table 2 reports simulations for the percentage loss in firm (non 
agent) profit under each regime relative to the network monopoly case (M1) and the 
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percentage loss in welfare, consumer surplus and aggregate quantity under each regime 
relative to the first best case, S under differing assumptions about the degree of 
substitutability, 𝜇.   
Table 2 
Firm (Non-Agent) Profit Simulations of % Loss Relative to Regime M1 and Welfare, 
Consumer Surplus and Aggregate Output Loss Relative to Regime S   
 
 
Degree of Substitutability (μ) 
 Regime 0 0.5 1 5 10 50 ∞ 
%
 r
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 
p
ro
fi
t 
re
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 𝝅
𝑴
𝟏
 
M2 0.0 0.5 1.4 7.1 10.0 14.0 15.3 
M3 50.0 50.5 51.4 56.4 58.7 61.6 62.5 
D1 5.6 4.7 4.5 6.2 7.8 10.2 11.1 
D2 0.0 0.7 1.9 9.5 13.3 18.2 19.9 
D3 50.0 50.6 51.7 57.7 60.3 63.5 64.5 
%
 r
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 
w
e
lf
a
re
 
re
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 𝑾
𝑺
 M1 
25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
M2 25.0 22.4 20.6 14.9 13.1 11.0 10.3 
M3 25.0 20.3 17.4 10.3 8.5 6.7 6.3 
D1 34.7 31.4 29.1 21.6 19.0 16.0 15.1 
D2 25.0 21.2 18.8 12.2 10.3 8.4 7.8 
D3 25.0 19.3 16.1 8.8 7.1 5.4 5.0 
%
 r
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 
co
n
su
m
e
r 
su
rp
lu
s 
re
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 𝑪
𝑺
𝑺
 M1 
75.0 69.4 65.0 47.2 39.3 28.7 25.0 
M2 75.0 66.6 60.0 35.6 25.9 14.2 10.3 
M3 75.0 64.3 56.3 29.7 20.3 9.6 6.3 
D1 81.9 73.8 67.3 42.4 32.2 19.4 15.1 
D2 75.0 65.4 58.0 32.3 22.7 11.4 7.8 
D3 75.0 63.1 54.4 27.3 18.2 8.1 5.0 
%
 r
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 
a
g
g
re
g
a
te
 q
u
a
n
ti
ty
 
re
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 𝑸
𝑺
 
M1 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
M2 50.0 47.5 45.7 40.4 38.5 36.4 35.7 
M3 50.0 45.0 41.7 32.1 29.2 26.0 25.0 
D1 58.3 55.3 53.0 45.7 43.0 39.9 38.9 
D2 50.0 46.1 43.3 34.8 32.0 28.9 27.9 
D3 50.0 43.9 40.0 29.6 26.5 23.3 22.4 
 Having identified regime D2 as a case of potential interest, we note that percentage loss 
in firm (non-agent) profit relative to regime M1 increases from 0% (6%) to 20% (11%) 
under regime D2 (D1) from 𝜇 = 0 to .  At the same time, welfare loss under regime D2 
(D1) relative to regime S varies between 25% (35%) to 8% (15%).  Substantial reductions 
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in welfare loss may be obtained pursuing D2 relative to M1 or D1 at relatively small cost to 
the firms. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have explored how the employment of an independent profit-maximising 
agent as a price-setter on cross-network commodity bundles in a network can be used to 
address the problem of network monopoly.  We showed that, whilst the welfare-maximising 
social planner may prefer network monopoly over splitting up the network (creating non-
collusive network duopoly) for sufficiently low levels of 𝜇 (the degree of substitutability 
between commodity bundles), the reverse holds for relatively high levels of 𝜇.  However, 
both of these scenarios are welfare-inferior to regulation using any one of the agent models: 
so in answer to the basic question of what to do with a network monopoly, it is important to 
note society prefers all four of the agent regimes over “doing nothing” (network monopoly) 
or splitting up the network monopoly into non-collusive network duopoly.  The relative 
welfare advantage of the agent-based regimes over the non-agent regimes is also increasing 
in 𝜇.   
 Predictably, some of the regimes that rank highly with the social planner are very 
harmful to the firms: such regimes might suffer from significant efforts by firms to avoid 
such regulation (i.e., rent seeking) or to distort the information available for make policy-
maker/regulator interventions.  Interestingly, two of the agent regimes, where the agent 
takes an arbitrarily small share of cross-network profit faces and faces a network monopoly 
or non-collusive network duopoly, have attractions for both firms and the social planner 
relative to alternative regimes making them potentially important compromise cases for 
both parties.   
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 Useful, non-trivial, developments of the existing work would examine the effectiveness of 
the agent solution in the context of consumption externalities and introducing bundling and 
compatibility as strategic choices.  
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Let 𝜎𝑀2,𝐷1𝜋 =
Π 𝑀2
Π 𝐷1
.   First, note that lim
𝜇→0
𝜎𝑀2,𝐷1
𝜋 =
1
2
< 1 and, 
using L’Hôpital’s Rule, lim
𝜇→∞
𝜎𝑀2,𝐷1
𝜋 =
784
747
> 1.  Finally, 
𝜕
𝜕𝜇
(𝜎𝑀2,𝐷1
𝜋 ) > 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇 ≥ 0 , hence 
𝜎𝑀2,𝐷1
𝜋  is a positive monotonic function of 𝜇 in the relevant range, and, lim
𝜇→3.490
𝜎𝑀2,𝐷1
𝜋 ≈ 1.     
     Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (iii) Let 𝜎𝐷1,𝑀1𝑊 =
W𝐷1
W𝑀1
.   First, note that lim
𝜇→0
𝜎𝐷1,𝑀1
𝑊 =
47
54
< 1 
and, using L’Hôpital’s Rule, lim
𝜇→∞
𝜎𝐷1,𝑀1
𝑊 =
275
243
> 1.  Finally, 
𝜕
𝜕𝜇
(𝜎𝐷1,𝑀1
𝑊 ) < 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇 ≥ 0 , hence 
𝜎𝐷1,𝑀1
𝑊  is a positive monotonic function of 𝜇 in the relevant range and lim
𝜇→2.418
𝜎𝐷1,𝑀1
𝑊 ≈ 1.     
     Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (ii) Let 𝜎𝐷1,𝐷2𝜋 =
Π 𝐷1
Π 𝐷2
.   First, note that lim
𝜇→0
𝜎𝐷1,𝐷2
𝜋 =
17
18
< 1 
and, using L’Hôpital’s Rule, lim
𝜇→∞
𝜎𝐷1,𝐷2
𝜋 =
4624
4167
> 1.  Finally, 
𝜕
𝜕𝜇
(𝜎𝐷1,𝐷2
𝜋 ) > 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇 ≥ 0 , hence 
𝜎𝐷1,𝐷2
𝜋  is a positive monotonic function of 𝜇 in the relevant range, and, lim
𝜇→2.175
𝜎𝐷1,𝐷2
𝜋 ≈ 1.     
     Q.E.D. 
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